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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

l

Case No. 860196

>

Priority 2

1
]

(Supreme Court No. 860243)

v.
CLINTON PERANK,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Criminal Proceedings in Lower Court
Appellant Clinton Perank was charged with burglary, a third

degree felony, in violation of Secton 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (R. 1).
Pursuant to a plea of guilty, Perank was convicted as charged
in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson presiding
(R. 10). Perank was sentenced on October 27, 1983, to serve an
indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State
Prison.

However, execution of the prison sentence was suspended

and he was placed on probation for eighteen (18) months, the
terms of which included, inter alia, payment of a $750.00 fine
and restitution, and a six-month jail sentence (execution of
which was suspended) (R. 11).
On December 5, 1983, Perank's probation was modified based
upon admitted violations of his probation agreement (R. 19).
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On January 28, 1985, Perank1s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging additional violations of probation (R. 42).
Perank failed to appear for a scheduled March 18, 1985, hearing
on probation revocation and a bench warrant was issued (R. 43).
A hearing was finally held on May 28, 1985, and the court found
Perank had violated the terms of his probation (R. 47). Sentencing was continued pending disposition of certain other criminal
charges against him (R. 47, 50-51).
On January 31, 1986, yet another probation violation report
was filed against Perank based upon a series of new violations
including fresh burglary and theft charges (R. 51-53).
ter was heard on April 21, 1986.

The mat-

Perank, for the first time

during any criminal proceedings in this case, asserted that the
court lacked jurisdiction over him because he is an Indian, and
the original burglary offense allegedly took place in Indian
country (R. 82). The lower court rejected these claims, and
thereafter revoked Perankfs probation and executed the prison
sentence (R. 63).
On or about October 21, 1986, the lower court, based upon
stipulation of counsel, stayed its order revoking Perankfs probation (see Supplemental Record on Appeal).
B.

Course of Proceedings Involving Appellantfs Indian Country
and Indian Status Claims
As noted above, Perankfs defense at his final probation revo-

cation hearing was that the court lacked jurisdiction because:
(1) the original burglary occurred in Indian country; and (2) he
is an Indian.
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Support for his claim that he is an Indian is essentially
based on Affidavits from his father and mother he presented at
the probation revocation hearing, and Article II of the Ute
Indian Tribal Constitution.

They allege that Perankfs father is

a full-blooded Indian and an enrolled member of the Ute Tribe,
that his mother has some Indian blood, and that Perank was born
in Roosevelt, Utah, while the family was residing on the Indian
reservation (R. 69-72).
Perank also asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction because the original crime took place in Indian country.

Indian

country is defined at 18 U.S.C. 1151 to include:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, . . .
Perank rests his position on the en banc decision of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah,
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 596 (Dec.
1, 1986) (App. Br. pp. 4-5). The en banc court, with two judges
dissenting, held that the original Uintah reservation still exists as originally established, undiminished (except for two
relatively small areas).

The burglary that led to Perankfs con-

viction occurred in Myton, Utah, which is located within the exterior boundaries of the original Uintah reservation as defined
by the en banc majority.
However, the state district court concluded that the crime
was not committed in Indian country.

In reaching this result,

that court necessarily agreed with the Statefs contention (R, 86-

87) that the reservation is limited to the trust lands.1/ The
trust lands are those lands held in trust by the United States
for the exclusive use and occupation of the Ute Indian Tribe, and
no one disputes that the trust lands occupy reservation status
and constitute Indian country within the purview of 18 U.S.C.
1151.

Myton—where the burglary occurred—is situated on non-

trust land.£/
While this matter was before the lower court on Perank's
probation violation, the Ute Indian case was pending before the
United States Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the State of Utah, Duchesne and Uintah Counties,
and Roosevelt and Duchesne Cities.

Subsequent to Perank's appeal

and the filing of his brief before the Utah Supreme Court, the
parties stipulated that Respondent's brief could await the ruling

1. The terms "Indian country" and "Indian reservation" are
often used interchangeably, and refer to the area—regardless of
land ownership—within the exterior boundaries of an Indian
reservation. The term "trust lands" refers to lands held in
trust by the United States for the exclusive use and occupation
of Indians or Indian tribes. See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, pp. 34-44 (1982 ed.). Thus, Indian country
or an Indian reservation, with attendant jurisdictional ramifications, can, depending on the situation, include non-Indian land
located within the exterior boundaries of a reservation.
2. See map, Ex. I-1B, which illustrates the boundary claims
of the parties as well as general land ownership in the area.
The foregoing citation is to the record in Ute Indian Tribe v.
State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072 (U.S.D.C. Utah 1981). When this
matter was before the trial court for the probation revocation
hearing, counsel for the parties stipulated that for purposes of
determining whether the crime occurred on the reservation (within
Indian country), the record before the federal court in the Ute
Indian Tribe case could be considered. Consequently all record
citations in our brief involving this issue will be to that
record. In this regard, JX refers to Joint Exhibits; LD refers
to the Joint Compendium of Legislative Documents; and the Trial
Court Transcript is referred to as Tr.
- 4 -

of the United States Supreme Court in the Ute Indian case. The
United States Supreme Court denied the writ on December 1, 1986
(107 S.Ct. 596). We concede that had the United States Supreme
Court accepted the Ute Indian case and issued a decision on the
merits, that would have been a dispositive judicial resolution of
the boundary question.

However, since the Supreme Court refused

to grant certiorari, there has been no definitive judicial
resolution of the boundary question by the highest federal court.
A denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits:
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a
petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it
should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Courtfs views on
the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and again:
again and again the admonition has to be repeated.
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1949), and
Stern, Gressman & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice, Section 5.7,
pp. 269-70 (6th ed. 1986).
This Court has a right to its own view on reservation
status.1/

Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme

Court in both DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
430-31 (1975), and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984),
because the Supreme Court of South Dakota reached a different
result than did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on whether or
not a reservation had been disestablished.

The Utah Supreme

3. Other state courts have found themselves in a similar
situation. See, e.g., State v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D.
1982), and Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977).
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Court has previously had occasion to address matters involving
the Ute Indian reservation.

Shortly after Congress opened the

reservation to settlement by non-Indians in 1905, the Utah
Supreme Court in both Sovards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P.
1112 (1910), and Whiterocks Irrigation Co, v. Mooseman, 45 Utah
79, 141 P. 459 (1914), recognized that the unallotted land had
been restored to the public domain.
In the 1970fs, the question of the status of the Ute reservation was specifically considered by the Utah Supreme Court.

The

Court concluded that the original Uintah reservation ceased to
exist, but did so without detailed discussion.

Brough v. Appawo-

ra, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated, Mem. 431 U.S. 901 (1977).
Pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 43 0
U.S. 584 (1977).

However, when Brough was remanded to the trial

court by the Utah Supreme Court, it was then removed to the
federal district court (District Judge Willis W. Ritter had previously restrained the State from proceeding in reliance on
Brough).

The case was ultimately dismissed without any state

court having considered the issue in light of Rosebud.
The United States, as amicus curiae before the United States
Supreme Court opposed certiorari in Ute Indian Tribe, but conceded in its discussion of Brough that, despite the consideration
of the boundary question by lower federal courts, the Utah courts
may again be called upon to consider the boundary issue:
The Utah Supreme Court did render a decision almost
a decade ago that seemed to assume that these lands
-

A

-

were no longer part of the Reservation. Brough v.
Appawora, 553 P.2d 934 (1976). But this Court, at
the urging of the United States, vacated that decision and remanded for further consideration in
light of Rosebud (431 U.S. 901 (1977)), and, as
petitioners concede (Pet. 19 n.35), the diminishment issue was not resolved on remand. If the Utah
Supreme Court nevertheless should adhere to its
prior view in some future case, notwithstanding the
intervening decision in Solem and the exhaustive
consideration of the issue by the courts below,
there will be time enough for this Court to grant
review.!/
C.

Relevant Facts Concerning the Uintah Reservation
The original Uintah reservation, which had been created in

the 1860's5/, consisted of more than two million acres, most of
which is located in Duchesne County.£/

Pursuant to the Act of

May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263), as amended, a Presidential
Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), provided that all
the unallotted and unreserved lands of the original Uintah
reservation were restored to the public domain and opened for
public settlement under the homestead and townsite laws.2/ The

4. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
14-15 in State of Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe, No. 85-1821
(November 1986).
5. The creation of the Uintah reservation and its early history are reviewed in some detail in the United States District
Court opinion in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1092-1100.
6. See Executive Order of Oct. 3, 1861 (I Kappler 900); Act
of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 63); and [1879] Commissioner of Indian
Aff. Rept., at 331 (JX 3). The western-most part of the original
reservation is located in Wasatch County and the eastern-most
part is located in Uintah County.
7. See, e.g., Uintah and White River Bands of Ute Indians v.
United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1, 22 (1957); Hanson v. United States,
153 F.2d 162, 162-63 (10th Cir. 1946); and Sowards v. Meagher,
supra, at 1116.

following exceptions were made from this Proclamation:

(1) the

Secretary of the Interior set aside approximately 250,000 acres
as a grazing reserve for the Ute Indians pursuant to the Joint
Resolution of June 19, 1902 (32 Stat. 744)§/; (2) more than one
million acres were added to the Uinta National Forest (34 Stat.
3116); and (3) some 56,000 acres were reserved for reservoir
sites for Indians and general agricultural development under the
Presidential Proclamation of August 3, 1905 (34 Stat. 3141, as
modified, 34 Stat. 3143).2/ Of the balance, approximately 99,000
acres were allotted to individual Indians and another 7,000
acres—the "Gilsonite Strip"—had already been restored to the
public domain in 1888 (25 Stat. 157).
After 1905 and for the next forty years, the tribal reserves,
together with the allotted lands in the original Uncompahgrel0/

8. More than 20,000 acres were also set aside by the Department of the Interior as a tribal timber reserve for the Ute
Indians. See, e.g., Memorandum of Chief Supervisor of Forests,
dated March 20, 1922, at 1 (JX 401). See also 1932 Annual Report
of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 427).
9. In the Act of April 4, 1910 (36 Stat. 269, 285), Congress
provided compensation and thereby extinguished all of the Ute
Indians1 right, title and interest to these reclamation lands.
The Utes were also ultimately compensated for the lands opened to
settlement and the National Forest withdrawals. See e.g., Uintah
and White River Bands of Ute Indians, supra, at 6-7, 11.
10. The allotted lands consisted only of approximately 12,500
acres. E.g., [1899] Commissioner of Indian Aff. Rept. at 543 (JX
117); and [1911] Commissioner of Indian Aff. Rept. at 92 (JX
353). The Uncompahgre reservation—which was created as a separate reservation from the Uintah reservation—was also the subject of the Ute Indian Tribe litigation (but is not involved
here). The Ute Indian Tribe today refers to the entire reservation as the Uintah and Ouray reservation.
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and Uintah reservations!!/, were treated as the Ute Indians1 existing reservation.

On August 25, 1945, however, a 217,000 acre

tract of opened and undisposed-of land located within what had
been part of the original Uintah reservation was, by Proclamation
of the Secretary of the Interior (10 Fed. Reg. 12409), restored
to tribal ownership and Hadded to and made a part of the existing
reservation11 pursuant to Sections 3 and 7 of the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act (48 Stat. 984). Later, the Act of March 11,
1948 (62 Stat. 72), added an additional 500,000 acres—the socalled Hill Creek Extension—to the Ute Indians1 reservation.
There is no dispute that the tribal reserves together with
the remaining allotments—some 360,000 acres—are "Indian country" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1151(a) and (c). Nor does
anyone question that the surplus lands restored to tribal ownership and reservation status in 1945 and 1948 (the Hill Creek
Extension)—which total more than 700,000 acres—are also Indian
country.

This entire area, comprising more than one million

acres,11/ had been considered the extent of the Tribe's existing

11. See e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J.,
dissenting); and S. Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1
(1919) (letter of the Secretary of Interior).
12. Approximately half of the trust lands lie within the
boundaries of the original Uintah reservation, while the other
half lies within the original Uncompahgre reservation. The Ute
Tribe contested that only these lands were originally treated as
its reservation. As the dissent in Ute Indian Tribe concluded,
however, the record establishes otherwise (see 773 F.2d 1105), a
point the en banc majority did not dispute. See also S. Doc. No78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the Sec. of
Interior); and 1957 Ute Tribe Ten-Year Development Program, at
66-68 (JX 465).

reservation until recent years (see, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773
F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., dissenting)).11/
As to the remaining portions of the original reservation,
where Congress ended Indian ownership long ago, the area has historically been the primary concern of the State and local governments.

The population and land use of the disputed area are more

than 90 percent non-Indian, and nearly all the enrolled members
of the Tribe live elsewhere,
(Seth, J., dissenting).

Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105

Within the disputed area (the non-trust

lands) there are a substantial number of incorporated towns and
cities (such as Roosevelt and Duchesne), and in recent years
there has been significant natural resource, business and recreational development.
While this case presents a question of criminal jurisdiction,
the implications of the decision transcend the narrow issue presented here.

Approximately 18,000 non-Indian inhabitants**/ of

the Uinta Basin area face the prospect of being suddenly thrust
into the status of residents of an Indian reservation, where

13. The tribal governmental unit is also located on the undisputed trust lands. The present governing body of the Ute
Indian Tribe is a six member Tribal Business Committee. Two representatives of each of the three Ute Bands, the White River, the
Uintah and the Uncompahgre, are elected to this Committee. In
the 1985 tribal election, a total of 430 votes were cast for all
candidates. Uintah Basin Standard, p. 20, April 17, 1985.
14. The combined population of Duchesne and Uintah Counties
is currently estimated to be 39,000; approximately 18,000 nonIndians live within the historic reservation boundaries. On the
other hand, the present number of enrolled members of the Tribe
is estimated to be 1,500. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105;
and Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Research Report, Univ. of Utah, Vol.
45, No. 1, p. 8, Table 5, July 1, 1984 (1985).
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their officials would have only limited jurisdiction and where
they would have no elective voice in the governance of their affairs and property by the Ute Tribe.

For its part, the Tribe has

already enacted a comprehensive Law and Order Code which, by its
terms, is applicable to Indians and non-Indians alike throughout
both historic reservation areas. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at
1101.

Although the Tribe would not have the criminal jurisdic-

tion they claimed over non-Indians (see Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the same cannot be said with
respect to civil jurisdiction.!^/

The Tribe1s Code also has a

comprehensive Exclusion and Removal section, which purports to be
applicable to both Indians and non-Indians throughout the two
original reservations in certain situations.
D.

Federal Court Litigation
Since Perank relies exclusively on the en banc decision in

Ute Indian Tribe to support his argument that the burglary took
place in Indian country, we summarize that litigation.

Because

15. National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 7
(1985). In 1981, the Supreme Court noted that Indian tribes
••retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on nonIndian fee lands. . . . H Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
565 (1981) (emphasis added). The lower courts, construing tribal
authority on reservation fee lands, have stated that such authority includes the power of taxation as well as some land use
and related regulation. See, e.g., Snow v. Quinault Indian
Tribe, 709 F.2d 1319 (9th~clr. 1983), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1214
(1984); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian
Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982); Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 964 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); and Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
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discussion of the legal principles in that litigation involved
both the Uintah and Uncompahgre reservations, we note rulings as
to both reservations—even though only the Uintah reservation is
involved here.

With respect to the boundaries of the Uintah

reservation, each of the three federal court decisions reached a
different result.
In 1975, after enacting its Law and Order Code, the Ute
Indian Tribe sued Duchesne County and the Cities of Roosevelt and
Duchesne, claiming that the original Uintah and Uncompahgre
reservations—the combined area of which exceeds four million
acres—presently exist to the full extent of their historic
boundaries.

The State of Utah subsequently intervened as a party

defendant in 1976, and Uintah County was joined as a defendant in
1979.

The district court held that the original Uncompahgre

reservation had been disestablished by the Act of June 7, 1897
(30 Stat. 62, 87). Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. 1110. The
court further held that the original Uintah reservation had been
diminished through:

(1) the withdrawal of the so-called "Gil-

sonite Strip" pursuant to the Act of May 24, 1888 (25 Stat. 157);
(2) the withdrawal of approximately one million acres for inclusion in the Uinta National Forest pursuant to the Act of March 3,
1905 (33 Stat. 1048, 1070); and (3) the withdrawal of approximately 56,000 acres of land for the Strawberry Reclamation Project by the Act of April 4, 1910 (36 Stat. 269, 285). Ute Indian
Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1153-54. The court also recognized, as had
the parties, that the Tribefs reservation had been enlarged to

include the 500,000 acre tract known as the "Hill Creek Extension" under the Act of March 11, 1948 (62 Stat. 72). Ute Indian
Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1109.
On appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed
the lower court's decisions that:

(1) the original Uncompahgre

reservation had been disestablished; (2) the original Uintah
reservation had been diminished by the withdrawal of the MGilsonite Strip" and the land for the Strawberry River Irrigation
Project; and (3) the Tribe's reservation was later expanded by
the Hill Creek Extension.

Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1304-15.

By a divided vote, the panel also affirmed the district court's
holding that the original Uintah reservation had been diminished
by the National Forest withdrawal.
1313-14.

Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at

Reversing the lower courtfs decision, the panel held

that reservation status had ended with respect to lands within
the original Uintah reservation opened for settlement pursuant to
the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended (32 Stat. 245, 263), and that
the present-day reservation consisted of only the "trust lands".
Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313.
The Tribe petitioned for rehearing solely in regard to the
status of the former Uintah reservation lands opened pursuant to
the 1902 Act.

After the Supreme Court's decision in Solem v.

Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), the court of appeals granted
rehearing en banc.

The Tribe then filed an amended petition to

include the status of the original Uncompahgre reservation and
the National Forest withdrawal from the original Uintah
reservation.
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The en banc court, with two judges dissenting, disagreed with
the decision of the panel and, invoking Solem, held that both the
original Uncompahgre and Uintah reservations still exist undiminished (except for the 1888 Gilsonite Strip and 1910 Strawberry Reclamation Project withdrawals).

Ute Indian Tribe, 773

F.2d 1087. The State and local governmental entities then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
which petition was denied on December 1, 1986 (107 S.Ct. 596).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Perank claims a lack of state district court jurisdiction in
this matter because he is an Indian and because the crime was
committed within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation
(Indian country).

To support his argument that the offense took

place in Indian country, Perank simply relies on the decision of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State
of Utah, et al., 773 F.2d 1087 (cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 596).
The en banc majority in Ute Indian Tribe held that the boundaries
of the Uintah reservation, which comprise the entire drainage
basin of the Duchesne River, remain intact.

This area encom-

passes a number of non-Indian communities such as Duchesne,
Roosevelt and Myton, Utah.
It is Respondents position that reservation status ended
with respect to lands within the original Uintah reservation
opened for settlement pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32
Stat. 245, 263), as amended, and that the present-day reservation
consists only of the "trust lands."
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Thus, there is no dispute

that the trust lands are Indian country.

But the criminal of-

fense involved here occurred off trust lands in Myton, Utah,
Reduced to its essentials, this appeal involves whether the nontrust-lands portion of the historic Uintah reservation is within
Indian country.
The en banc majority failed to apply the correct analytical
test consistent with relevant United States Supreme Court precedents.

In this regard, the en banc majority incorrectly con-

cluded that the Supreme Court1s decision in Solem established new
standards for evaluating disestablishment cases, but (as is shown
in Point I.A., infra) this is not so.

By failing to apply the

correct test, the en banc majority did not give proper consideration to language in the acts of Congress opening the reservation
to settlement and restoring surplus lands to the public domain.
Such language constitutes a clear expression of congressional
intent to disestablish.

This legislation, as well as the legis-

lative history and circumstances surrounding the opening of the
Uintah reservation from 1902 to 1905, clearly shows a congressional intent to restore the surplus lands of the reservation to
the public domain, and thus to disestablish the reservation
(Point I.B.2, infra).
The en banc majority also ignored other relevant factors that
must be considered under the Supreme Court's decisions. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that a de facto, if not a de jure,
disestablishment may have occurred.

See, e.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S.

at 604-05, and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.

- 15 -

By focusing all of its

attention on Solem and treating it as setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself to the teachings of the
Supreme Court*s earlier decisions.

In addition to the statutory

language, the surrounding circumstances and legislative history
are to be examined in interpreting surplus land enactments.
Subsequent administrative and congressional treatment are also
relevant factors.

Who actually moved onto the opened reservation

land is likewise relevant to deciding whether a surplus land act
diminished a reservation and whether the area has lost its Indian
character.

The record here demonstrates that the en banc majori-

ty did not consider these factors in a manner consistent with
relevant principles (Point I.B.3, infra).
The administrative, congressional and judicial treatment of
the disputed area subsequent to the 1905 opening confirms the
fact that the Uintah reservation was disestablished.

The subse-

quent treatment of the area clearly demonstrates that federal,
State and local governments treated the disputed area as not
being part of the Uintah reservation.

In addition, the de-

mographic history of the disputed area strongly supports disestablishment.

The land ownership and population in the disputed

area is overwhelmingly non-Indian, with the great majority of
tribal members residing on Indian-owned trust lands.

To place

the disputed area in Indian country status would upset the longheld justifiable expectations of the non-Indian population who
moved into this area and settled, and it would not significantly
enhance tribal sovereignty.

Further, it would greatly impair

State and local governmental functions and authority in the Uinta
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Basin.

And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be

said that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections
1152 and 1153 was not established below.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
Perank claims his crime was committed within Indian country

as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allegation that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of
jurisdiction.

The following section of this brief will demon-

strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished
and today consists only of "trust lands," and Perank's offense
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished.

This

is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation
which show that it has been disestablished.
A*

General Principles Governing Disestablishment
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263),

as amended, a Presidential Proclamation issued on July 14, 1905
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the
public domain and opened for public settlement under the homestead and townsite laws.

It is settled law that some surplus

land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe
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v. Knelp, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), and DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and other surplus land acts did not,
see, e.g,, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), and Seymour v.
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69.

As explained in Solem, the Supreme Court has established a "fairly clean analytical structure" for distinguishing those surplus
land acts that of their own force effected an immediate diminishment of the reservation from those acts that simply permitted
non-Indians to purchase land within an existing reservation and
left to another day the actual redrawing of its boundaries (id.
at 470). Because Appellant does no more than submit the decision
of the en banc majority to support his contention that the crime
took place in Indian country, we must examine that decision in
light of controlling Supreme Court precedents.
1.

The en banc majorityfs decision in Ute Indian Tribe that

the historic reservations were not disestablished ultimately
rests on the proposition that restoration to public domain language is not the same as a congressional state of mind to disestablish and does not reliably establish the clear and unequivocal
evidence of Congress1 intent to change boundaries.

In so hold-

ing, the majority acknowledged that this had not been the law
prior to Solem and, indeed, all of the judges who had considered
this case before Solem agreed that such language was synonymous
with disestablishment.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1303

(panel opinion); id. at 1316 (Doyle, J., dissenting); and 521
F.Supp. at 1122 (district court opinion).

To the en banc major-

ity, however, Solem altered this long-standing principle of

- 18 -

interpretation and marked a new direction in the Supreme Court's
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reservations.

Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u]nder the

Solem standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any
of the congressional enactments in question".

Ute Indian Tribe,

773 F.2d at 1090-91.
The majority's reading of Solem is not correct.

Solem did

not establish new "standards" and it did not alter the principles
announced in Seymour, Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud# which the
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established
reservation boundaries."

465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court

has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 & n.12), the
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that congressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586, and
Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71).
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation.
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587.

In each of the disestablishment cases
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decided before Solem, the Court expressly acknowledged that restoration to public domain constitutes firm and unequivocal language of disestablishment.

See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589 & n.5;

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 446; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504, n.22;
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-55; and United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442, 445-46 (1914).

In the clearest possible terms, the

Court stated that restoration to the public domain meant
••stripped of reservation status."

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446.

The decisions in Rosebud and Decoteau fairly reflect the view
of the Court on this point.

Although in both cases the Court was

divided on the question whether the particular area involved had
retained reservation status, the Court was unanimous that such
restoration language amounted to a unequivocal expression of an
intent to disestablish.

See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, n.5; id.

at 618 (Marshall, J.f dissenting); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27,
446; id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

Indeed, Justice

Marshall—who wrote the Court*s opinion in Solem—observed in his
dissenting opinion in Rosebud that an 1889 surplus land act expressly restoring lands to the public domain (25 Stat. 896, sec.
21) was wyet another example" of M•clear language of express termination. . • ••••' Id., 430 U.S. at 618.
Solem did not reject or alter this firmly-established rule of
interpretation.

The crucial provision interpreted in Solem did

not provide for the restoration of the surplus lands to the
public domain, nor was any such language contained in the operative portions of the Solem legislation.

Instead, a reference to

••public domain11 appeared in a subsequent section providing that

tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the
opened lands, "only as long as the land remained part of the
public domain."

Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged

that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablishment; it found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated,"
it could not be dispositive.

Solem, 465 U.S. at 475.

In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in
using..." public domain terminology in the Solem legislation
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the
•public domain1 inasmuch as they were available for settlement"
(id., 465 U.S. at 475, n.17).

It is evident, however, that the

Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain
language in every other instance.

The Court had already indi-

cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its comments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a drastic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of
such restoration language.
The en banc majorityfs decision to the contrary also overlooks the Solem Court1s later observation, in the context of
subsequent jurisdictional history, that:
Unentered lands were considered a part of the
reservation. They were available for allotment to
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of
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the tribe, and they were specifically defined as
different from land in public domain.
Id. at 480, n.25 (emphasis added), quoting F. Hoxie, Jurisdiction
on the Cheyenne River Reservation:

An Analysis of the Causes and

Consequences of the Act of May 29, 1908, at 87 (undated).

The

reference to public domain in the quoted passage can only be
understood on the basis that public domain and reservation status
are mutually exclusive.!§/

In short, Solem does not signal the

Supreme Court's abandonment of its previous interpretations of
restoration to public domain language.

Such language continues

to be the clearest expression of disestablishment.
2.

Although Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v.

Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 3420 (1985),11/ required that the
various acts involved here—which contain identical operative
language—should be interpreted to have the same effect, the en
banc majority did not do so and thereby compounded its error.

In

this regard, there was no dispute that the so-called "Gilsonite

16. This is how the author of the quoted study understood
it, as he considered public domain status to be crucial in interpreting the subsequent jurisdictional treatment of the area involved. See Hoxie, supra, at 87, 88. Thus, he stated that it
was necessary to determine whether the area in question was "administered as part of the public domain. . . . w Id., at 87.
17. In that case, the issue was whether that Tribe retained
treaty hunting and fishing rights in an area ceded under a 1901
cession agreement. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422. In interpreting this
agreement, the Court initially looked to the construction given a
prior treaty with the same Tribe containing similar cession language. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422, 3428. As the Court there explained, "[pjresumptively, the similar language used in the 1901
Cession Agreement should have the same effect." 105 S.Ct. at
3428.
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Strip"—a 7,000-acre tract located on the edge of the original
Uintah reservation—was disestablished by the Act of May 24, 1888
(25 Stat. 157). See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1098
(Seymour, J., concurring).

Compare with district court opinion,

id., 521 F.Supp. at 1099.

See also panel opinion, id., 716 F.2d

at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting).

As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-

gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in
the Gilsonite Strip. • . ."

Idl^, 773 F.2d at 1098.

Yet the

operative provisions concerning the Gilsonite Strip used the same
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus Land Act and expressly restored the area "to the public domain" (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157).
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration language contained in the 1902 Uintah Act should be interpreted differently, and there is none.liL/
3.

The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds with

the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment
cases.

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-

sions, have consistently recognized that restoration to public
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent
to disestablish.il/

Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior

18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the understanding of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in
interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute
Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112.
19. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90
(8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); United States ex
rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973); Beardslee v. United States, 387
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to Solem had also assumed that such language was synonymous with
disestablishment,^2/

The significance these decisions accorded

to restoration to public domain language has a sound historical
foundation and follows well-established principles regarding
public lands.
dissenting).

See Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106 (Seth, J.,
Long before the acts in question here, it was set-

tled law that when the federal government appropriates or reserves a tract for any purpose, such as an Indian reservation, the
tract is thereby severed from the public domain—that is, it
loses its status as public land.H/

In 1889, for instance, the

19. (Cont'd.) F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 1967); DeMarrias v.
South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963); Russ v. Wilkins,
624 F.2d 914, 915, 924 & 927-29 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 817 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
1042 (1984); United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 525 F.2d
120, 124 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); and
Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1957).
District court and state court decisions in the disestablishment context have been to the same effect. See, e.g., Russ v.
Wilkins, 410 F.Supp. 579, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908
(1981); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 344 F.Supp.
777, 778 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973);
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.Supp. 1001,
1005 (D. Minn. 1971); Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 119
(S.D. 1977); Wood v. Jameson, 130 N.W.2d 95, 99 (S.D. 1964); and
Lafferty v. State, 125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 1963).
20. See Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir.
1965); TooTsgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 98, 104 (10th Cir.
1950) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513
(1839) ; Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Co. v.
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889); Bardon v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 535, 539 (1892); Spalding
v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1896); Gibson v. Anderson, 131
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Supreme Court remarked that:
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands . . . has been
reaffirmed and applied by this court in such a
great number and variety of cases that it may now
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles
underlying the land system of this country.
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co., 132 U.S. at 360-61. Contrary
to the en banc majorityfs view, because the reservation of a
tract removed it from the public domain,£2/ later restoration of
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reservation status.23/
In sum, the en banc majority's interpretation not only is
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also

21. (Contfd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v.
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1882); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan.
1881); and United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark.
1881). "Public domain" and "public lands" traditionally have
been regarded as "equivalent" concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181
U.S. 481, 490 (1901).
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior explained
years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation,
H
[a]lthough the . . . reservation had been created out of the
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status
of public domain land while included within the reservation. . .
." Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950).
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S.
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain1 . .
." by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensation was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Executive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kappler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . . " Id. at
330.
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is untenable from an historical perspective.

At the turn of the

century, reservation status and public domain status were uniformly understood to be mutually exclusive.

In construing res-

toration language as it has, the Tenth Circuit has thus attempted
to ••remake history," which the Supreme Court admonished "cannot"
be done in order to resurrect a reservation that long ago ceased
to exist.

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; accord Rosebud, 430 U.S. at

615.
B.

The Original Uintah Reservation was Disestablished
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended,
and Today is Comprised Only of the Trust Lands
1.

Governing Principles Support Disestablishment
As discussed above, the en banc majority misread

Solem as changing the Supreme Court's analytical test for determining reservation disestablishment, and failed to apply the
proper test when considering the legislation which opened the
Uintah reservation and restored the unallotted lands to the
public domain.

Restoration to public domain language constitutes

firm and unequivocal language for disestablishment (DeCoteau, 42 0
U.S. at 445-46), and demonstrates "an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment11 (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 592).
The analysis of the "public domain" language in the 1902 Act
as amended by subsequent acts is a key part of the analysis to
determine whether or not the reservation was disestablished.

The

en banc majority did not consider this legislation in a manner
consistent with relevant precedents, while the en banc dissent
followed the correct analytical test and reached the correct
result.

Subsection 2 below is an analysis of the legislation
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opening the reservation.

It clearly shows a congressional intent

to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under
Solem but also under the Supreme Court1s prior decisions.

Sum-

marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem stated that when the
area involved "has long since lost its Indian character, we have
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have
occurred. • . ."

465U.S. at 471. Thus, "who actually moved

onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . .If Id.
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself
to the teachings of the Supreme Courtfs earlier decisions.

In

addition to the statutory language, "the •surrounding circumstances,f and the legislative history1 are to be examined" in
interpreting surplus land enactments.

Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587.

Accord, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 469-70. The record here demonstrates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents.
3 below reviews these other relevant factors.

Subsection

They vividly dem-

onstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the
functioning of State and local governments.
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We now turn to a specific discussion of the legislation,
legislative history, demographics and other circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation.
2.

The Uintah Reservation was Disestablished Pursuant
to the Act of May 27, 1902y as amended
a.

Creation of the Uintah Reservation
The Uintah reservation was created by President

Abraham Lincoln by Executive Order in 1861 and included the entire area within the drainage basin of the Duchesne River, comprising approximately 2,039,040 acres (about 3,186 square miles).
This was later confirmed by Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 63). The
various bands of the Ute Tribe were encouraged to move to the
Uintah reservation so they would finally be settled in a designated area.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1092-1100, for

a discussion of the creation and early history of the Uintah
reservation.
b.

Early Efforts to Restore Surplus Reservation
Lands to the Public Domain—The 1902 Act
The period around the turn of the century wit-

nessed an active effort by Congress and the President to disestablish large Indian reservations by making individual allotments
to the Indians and then restoring the remaining lands to the
public domain for settlement.

This, Congress hoped, would

facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the general society.
The Uintah reservation was not the only reservation where the
allotment and surplus program was instigated; it was happening in
several other reservations in the West at about the same time
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period.

See General Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-

teau at 432-33; and Solem at 466-67.
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess
of the lands needed to satisfy the allotments to the Indians.
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat.
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and
included a provision restoring any lands not allotted to the
Indians to the public domain.

The relevant portion of the Act

states:
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable
by an inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land
to each other member of said tribes, said allotments to be made prior to October first, nineteen
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted
lands within said reservation shall be restored to
the public domain: I I • (Emphasis added)•
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reservation contained "public domain1' language which is language "precisely suited" to disestablishment.

DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446.

Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amended to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated
••an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment."
592.

Id. at

See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

An important observation is that, in 1902, Congress believed
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands
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could be allotted and the surplus restored to the public domain
and thus opened to private settlement and entry under the public
land laws.

Efforts to obtain the consent of the Indians to al-

lotment were unsuccessful within the time limits set forth in the
1902 Act and Congress was forced to take further action with
regard to opening the Uintah reservation.

However, this task was

made easier by the Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that Congress had exclusive and plenary power to deal with reservation lands, without
the necessity of obtaining the approval or consent of the
Indians.
c.

Action After the 1902 Act
Reacting to the latitude confirmed by the Supreme

Court in Lone Wolf, supra, Congress promptly enacted the Act of
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982), which directed that the Uintah
reservation should be allotted and the surplus lands opened for
settlement and entry under the public land laws.2^/

in 1904 Con-

gress again extended the time for the opening to March 10, 1905,
so that surveying could be completed and allotments made (33
Stat. 207).
In the meantime, on April 27, 1903, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs prepared instructions for United States Indian
Inspector James McLaughlin regarding the opening of the Uintah

24. It is worthy of note that it took Congress fewer than
sixty days following the decision of the Supreme Court in Lone
Wolf in which to mandate the opening of the Uintah reservation
without the consent of the Indians.
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reservation.

The Department of Interior viewed the administra-

tive task under the 1903 Act to be one of making allotments to
the Indians and restoration of the surplus lands to the public
domain as set forth in the 1902 Act.

In May of 1903, Inspector

McLaughlin met with the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to
them that the reservation was to be terminated without their consent and that allotments would be made.

The following extract

from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's
understanding that the reservation boundaries were to be extinguished (JX 162, pg. 42):
Inspector McLaughlin:
A number of your speakers have said that you do
not want your land stolen from you. My friends,
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all
remain just as they are. There will be no change
in the nature of the country but the improvements
that will come when white people come in among you.
My friends, Red Cap said my talk was cloudy, and
you do not understand it. You are the people who
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the
light. You say that line is very heavy and that
the reservation is nailed down upon the border.
That is very true as applying to the past many""
years and up to now, but congress has provided
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold
down that line and after next year there will be no
outside boundary line to this reservation^ (Emphasis added).±k/
d.

The Act of March 3, 1905
The time set by the 1904 Act for opening the

reservation (March 10, 1905) was running out.

Early in 1905, the

25. For a more detailed version of McLaughlin1s negotiations
with the Indians, see JX 162, pp. 42-45. A subsequent report of
McLaughlin, summarizing his meetings with the Utes, can be found
at LD 101, pp. 9-12.
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Department of Interior had not been able to complete surveys of
reservation land in order to make the allotments, so that the
excess lands could in turn be ascertained and restored to the
public domain.

This delay prompted the Senate, on February 4,

1905, to demand an explanation from the Secretary of the Interior
as to why he apparently was not going to meet the March 10 deadline (see LD 101 at p. 1). The Secretary reported promptly,
under date of February 15, 1905, setting forth the progress that
had been made, and explaining, inter alia, that the Department
had experienced difficulty in completing land surveys so that
allotments could be made and this had prevented a timely completion of the allotment program.

He thus made clear the need for

an extension of time in which to complete the allotment program.
Accordingly, by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048),
Congress extended the effective date for terminating the reservation from March 10, 1905, to September 1, 1905. The Act provided
in relevant part:
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such
tracts as may have been set aside as national
forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were disposed of by the act of Congress of May twentyseventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and town-site laws of the United States, and
shall be opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be
settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof; . . .
That before the opening of the Uintah Indian Reservation the President is hereby authorized to set
apart and reserve as an addition to the Uintah
Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and
regulations governing forest reserves, and subject
to the mineral rights granted by the act of Congress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and
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two, such portions of the lands within the Uintah
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir
site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the water supply for the Indians or for
general agricultural development, and may confirm
such rights to water thereon as have already accrued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty,
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with
the provisions of the act opening the reservation.
(Emphasis in original.)
e.

The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts
The en banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33

Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain.
Compare Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12
(Seth, J., dissenting).

That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-

ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding
circumstances.
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act.

Rather, the 1905 Act

contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be disposed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by
proclamation of the President."

But the 1905 Act did not purport

to change whether there should be a disestablishment.
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act.

That had

The 1905 Act merely

addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing disestablishment.

There is no conflict or inconsistency between the

two.
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The provision in the 1905 Act that the surplus lands were to
be disposed of under the homestead and townsite provisions of the
public land laws certainly does not constitute a restriction to
the declaration in the 1902 Act that the lands were to be restored to the public domain.

The intent of the 1902 Act was car-

ried over into the 1905 Act.
The circumstances surrounding the Uintah reservation opening
are similar in many respects to those in Rosebud, supra, where
the Supreme Court found there to be a diminishment of reservation
boundaries.

In Rosebud, the Court held that the operative lan-

guage of the original act demonstrated "an unmistakable baseline
purpose of disestablishmentff (430 U.S. at 592) even though the
opening of the reservation was actually implemented by subsequent
legislation.

The same is true for the Uintah reservation legis-

lation in that each later act merely builds on the original act
and deals primarily with extending the time for opening.2j6/
The legislative history of the 1905 Act, however, demonstrates that Congress was implementing, not abandoning, the 1902
Actfs baseline purpose to end the Uintah reservation.

Compare S.

Rep. No. 4240, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., at 14-16 (1905) (letters of
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs and the General Land Office)
with Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112 (Seth, J., dissenting)
(H[n]othing in the Congressional debates suggests an attempt to

26. On this point, the Tenth Circuit's en banc decision is
contrary to its views as expressed in Hanson v. U.S., 153 F.2d
162 (10th Cir. 1946), where it was concluded that the 1905 Act
merely extended the date of opening and did not alter or affect
the operative terms of the 1902 Act.
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change the 1902 intent. . . " ) .

See also, debates at 39 Cong.

Rec. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103).
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other
than a speedy conclusion of the allotment process) was that land
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land.
See "Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry was to
keep the reservation intact.

To the contrary, the pertinent dis-

cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would
still be restored to the public domain.

Senator Teller, one of

the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings:
H

I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land

if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at
30) (emphasis added).

Further, there is nothing in the congres-

sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uintah reservation.
The real purpose and intent of the 1905 Act was not only to
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public domain as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite
laws in order to prevent speculation.

Limitations on entry such

as those contained in the 1905 Act are not inconsistent with the
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands
to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.
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Again,

the cumulative series of acts in this case can be compared to
those in Rosebud where the Supreme Court held there to be a
disestablishment.

Rosebud at 592.

That the 1905 Act carried the 1902 Act into effect is further
clearly demonstrated by the Presidential Proclamation opening the
original Uintah reservation for entry and settlement.

The Presi-

dential Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), employing
much the same format as that used in the 1904 Rosebud Proclamation, provided:
Whereas it was provided by the Act of Congress,
approved May 27, . . . 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among
other things, that on October first, 1903, the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in
the State of Utah, "shall be restored to the public
domain: . . . . M
And, whereas, the time for the opening of said
unallotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904,
by the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1903 (32
Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10, 1905, by
the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1904 (33
Stat., 207), and was again extended to not later
than September 1, 1905, by the Act of Congress,
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), which last
named act provided, among other things:
[The Act is here quoted]
Now, therefore, I . . . do hereby declare . . .
that all the unallotted lands in said reservation,
excepting such as have at that time been reserved
. . ., and such mineral lands as may have been
disposed of . . ., will on and after the 28th day
of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry,
settlement, and disposition under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the
United States. . . .
34 Stat, at 3119-20 (emphasis added).
The President thus clearly understood that the 1905 Act was
implementing—not deviating from—the purpose of disestablishment
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underlying the 1902 Act.

The 1905 Proclamation is similar to the

one involved in Rosebud and constitutes an "unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the Nation1s Chief Executive of a perceived disestablishment. . ." (id., 430 U.S. at 602-03), and
unmistakably reflects the intent of Congress.

See id. at 603.

On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent.
3.

Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment
In addition to examining the legislation opening a

reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component
of its Hfairly clean analytical structure" is to examine the
subsequent history of the area:
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized
that who actually moved onto opened reservation
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion
of a reservation and the area has long since lost
its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra,
at 588, n 3, and 604-605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct

1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to
de facto diminishment, we look to the subsequent
demographic history of opened lands as one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen once land on a particular reservation was
opened to non-Indian settlers.
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
The Court further noted that:
When an area is predominately populated by nonIndians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian
Country seriously burdens the administration of
State and local governments.
Solem at 471, n.12.
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In Rosebud, the Court stated:
The fact that neither Congress nor the Department of Indian Affairs has sought to exercise its
authority over this area, or to challenge the
State's exercise of authority, is a factor entitled
to weight as a part of the "jurisdictional history.1* The long-standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90%
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not
only demonstrates the parties1 understanding of the
meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable
expectations which should not be upset by so
strained a reading of the Acts. . .
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. We will now briefly examine several
additional factors which strongly support disestablishment.
a.

Subsequent Administrative and Congressional
Recognition of Termination
The 1905 Presidential Proclamation, discussed

supra, which opened the reservation, does not stand alone in its
reference that the surplus lands were restored to the public domain.

The understanding of other responsible government offi-

cials has, until recent years, consistently mirrored President
Roosevelt's construction.7JJ

Many of the documents cited in the

27. See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs to the Secretary of Interior, dated May 11, 1905, at 3
(JX 463) ; Letter of the Acting Secretary of Interior, dated September 3, 1909; Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to Senator Reed Smoot, dated December 20, 1909; Letter of
the Secretary of Interior to Senator Reed Smoot, dated January
12, 1911; H.R. Doc. No. 892, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912)
(Joint Report of Inspector James McLaughlin and the Chief Supervisor) ; H.R. Doc. No. 1250, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at 1-2 (1914)
(Letter of the Secretary); Letter of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated
September 28, 1922, at 1 (JX 403); Letter of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated December 1, 1927, at 2; 54 I.D. 559, 561-62
(1934) (JX 431); Solicitor Opinion M-33626, at 2 (August 3,
1944); Secretarial Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 12409 (1945) (LD 183); 59
I.D. 393 (1947); Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 1-2, 5 (December
7, 1950); Appeal of Edward M. Brown, A-26523, at 1-2 (December
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margin expressly recognize that, with respect to the original
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands were restored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act.
The record shows as well that officials of the Interior Department treated the original Uintah reservation as having been
disestablished.

Thus, with the opening of the reservation in

1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the
original area as the Mformer" reservation.

For decades after the

opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the
trust lands (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status)
as the Tribefs existing reservation,2JL/ a practice that continued
until recently.29/

27. (Contfd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Gonsales, at 1
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920
(1971) (LD 210).
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1,
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc.
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 & 6
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior).
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Assft. Attorney General).
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S.
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah &
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Grazing Report, at 1, 3
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior);
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations
in Arizona, Nevada & Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 480).
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Subsequent legislation and other congressional materials are
to the same effect.22/

Numerous congressional documents subse-

quent to the 1905 opening contain references to the "former"
reservation.

See for example, Senate Report No. 219, 61st Cong.

2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1910 (LD 138) entitled "Making Available Lands
On Former Uintah Indian Reservation," (emphasis added).21/
It should be noted that these numerous and repeated references in congressional documents were consistent with the policy of
the day of disestablishing Indian reservations and assimilating
the Indians into society.

30. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 196; S. Rep.
No. 139, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 291,
59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); S. Rep. No. 893, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 943, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 1-2 (1912); S. Rep. No. 979, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2
(1926); H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1927);
and 74 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1931). Characteristic of Congress*
treatment is the Act of July 20, 1912, which provided that:
any person who has heretofore made a homestead entry for
land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian
Reservation in the State of Utah, authorized by the Act
approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two,
and Acts amendatory thereto. . . .
37 Stat. 196 (emphasis added).
603, n.25.

See also Rosebud, 430 U.S. at

31. For other past tense references to the "former" reservation, see: Congressional Floor Debates, Jan. 15, 1906, p. 1064
(LD 116); Senate Bill 321, Jan. 27, 1906 (LD 120); H.R. Rep. No.
823, Feb. 9, 1906 (LD 122); S. Rep. No. 2561—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 131, April 13, 1906 (LD 124); S. Rep. No. 4263,
June 12, 1906 (LD 126); Public Law 258 (H.R. 15331, pp. 375-76)
June 21, 1906 (LD 127); H.R. Rep. No. 5010, June 25, 1906 (LD
128); Senate Bill 6375 (P.L. 345) June 29, 1906 (LD 129); P.L.
104—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 95, April 30, 1908 (LD 135);
P.L. 144—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 285, April 4, 1910 (LD
139); P.L. 434—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 1074, March 31,
1911 (LD 141); P.L. 717, 70 Stat. 546, 548, July 14, 1956 (LD
203) .
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Judicial pronouncements also follow suit.

In decisions ren-

dered prior to Ute Indian Tribe, the courts interpreted the 1905
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.l^/ Indeed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v.
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc
majority—that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original
Uintah reservation were "restored to the public domain by the Act
of May 27, 1902. . . ."

Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court

likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to
the public domain under these Acts.

Sowards, 108 P. at 1114.

Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the Tribe*s reservation was considered to be only
those lands held in trust by the federal government.

Affiliated

Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972).
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation
remains intact, the en banc majority has created what must be one
of the few—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a national forest.

The district court and the panel of the court of

appeals agreed that such an anomaly was not intended and that the
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048,
1069-70, which set aside more than 1 million acres "as an addition to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the laws, rules and
regulations governing forest reserves," thereby diminished the

32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah
and White River Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 & 21-22;
United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and
Sowards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910).
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original Uintah reservation.
14.

Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313-

The en banc majority thought, incorrectly, that under Solem

the transfer of the administration of these one million acres
from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture and
the fact that Congress later compensated the Tribe for its interest in the forest lands were not inconsistent with continued
reservation status.

Despite the fact, as the federal district

court stated, that the "status and purpose of national forest
lands are distinct from the status and purpose of Indian reservations" (Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp at 1138), the en banc
majority apparently believed that under Solem this could be ignored and that the Tribe therefore had jurisdiction within the
national forest (Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090).

There is,

however, nothing in the Court's Solem opinion that justifies such
an extraordinary result.

Congress clearly ended the original

Uintah reservation on the land withdrawn for a national forest,
which further demonstrates its intent to disestablish the reservation itself.
The United States supported the Ute Tribe as amicus curiae in
the recent federal litigation with respect to the Uintah reservation.

In so doing, the United States failed to acknowledge the

inconsistency of that position with its position in other litigation involving this reservation.

In Uintah and White River Bands

of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1 (1957), it entered
into a stipulation with which the Court of Claims agreed (139
Ct.Cl. at 5-6, 22) which quoted the 1902 Act and then succinctly
stated the critical point:

"Pursuant to this [1902] Act and
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amendments thereto, . • . allotments in severalty . . . . were
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands . .
• . were restored to the public domain, and opened for disposition under the public land laws for the benefit of the Indians11
(emphasis added).

What is more, the United States (and the Utes)

consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah
reservation was a former reservation; and throughout its opinion
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uintah reservation as having ended.
56, 64, 69 and 70.

E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28,

It is also worthy of note that when the Ute

Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it
up well:

"Now, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of

particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as
amended under which the Uintah Reservation was ultimately broken

up."22/
b.

Subsequent Demographic History Supports
Disestablishment
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-

strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local governments in a myriad of areas.
character" long ago.

The disputed area "lost its Indian

It is "predominantly populated by non-

33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and
White River Band of Utes v. U.S., No. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954).
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Indians," approximately 18#000 of them,21/ with only about 1,500
tribal members, who are living mainly on trust lands. Ute Indian
Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., dissenting).

The non-Indians

are the ones "who actually moved onto the opened reservation
lands" and have been there ever since. Thus, there has indeed
been a de facto or de jure disestablishment.

It is their "jus-

tifiable expectations," built up over a 60-year period, that
would be upset if it were to be held that the original boundaries
are still intact and it is their interests the en banc majority
ignored, despite the United States Supreme Court's command that
such factors must be taken into account.

E.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S.

at 605; and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
Under the en banc majorityfs result, the Ute Tribe would preside over an area owned and predominantly populated by nonIndians and, hence, in which the Tribe has little presence and no
real interest as a sovereign.

At the same time, State and local

authority would be significantly limited despite the fact that
this area has principally been the concern and responsibility of
these governments, not the Tribe.

This would include increased

tribal court jurisdiction over all residents of the area, and
diminished state court jurisdiction.
The testimony and exhibits introduced in the federal district
court clearly establish that the State and its local governmental
divisions had exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic

34. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General
Population Characteristics Utah, Table 15, p. 46-12 (1980).
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reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust
lands.

The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area

shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the
laws of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding
trust lands).2$/

For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-

intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 380), it
was stated as follows:
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction
over their persons. Where offences have been committed against the laws of the State, the matter
has been reported to the County authorities and the
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with
the County authorities in the maintenance of law
and order.
Id. at 2-3.

Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that

the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area beginning in the early 1900fs.2§/
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State
and local officials introduced at the federal district court trial.

This testimony shows that until recently the State continued

35. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380
at 2; JX 386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399
at 2; JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420.
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78
(testimony of George Marett, Sheriff of Duchesne County).
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to exercise primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area, except on the trust lands.22/
The evidence introduced in this case regarding the exercise
of jurisdictional authority by the Tribe also confirms that the
State and local governmental subdivisions have, until recently,
exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area, except on the trust lands.2§/
Finally, until recently the Ute Tribe itself treated only the
trust lands as the Tribe's post-1905 reservation.21*/

As the dis-

sent in Ute Indian Tribe observed:
Statements made by the Utes themselves also tend to detract from their position. For example, the 1957 Ute
Ten Year Development Program provides a description of
the total acreage of the Uintah and Ouray reservation as
currently containing 1,010,000 acres. . . .
773 F.2d at 1114.

37. See Trial Tr. at 106 (testimony of Clair Huff, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 121 (testimony of Norman Hancock,
Division of Wildlife Resources); 158-59 (testimony of David
Thomas, Division of Wildlife Resources); 186-87 (testimony of
Edward Tuttle, Utah Division of Parks and Recreation); 220 (testimony of Donald Smith, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 251
(testimony of C. Blake Feight, Utah Division of Oil, Gas &
Mining); 267, 270-74, 277-79 and 281-89 (testimony of George
Marett, Duchesne County Sheriff); and 298-99 (testimony of Ray
Wardle, member and Chief of Tribal Police, cross-deputized by
Uintah County).
38. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 121 and 135 (testimony of Norman
Hancock); 159 (testimony of David Thomas); 174 (testimony of Gordon Harmston, Utah Department of Natural Resources); 187 (testimony of Edward Tuttle); 228 (testimony of Charles East); 251
(testimony of C. Blake Feight); 262-63 (testimony of Alfred Parriette, Tribe1s Division of Wildlife Management and Law Enforcement) ; and 294-300 (testimony of Ray Wardle).
39. See, e.g., 1957 Ute Ten-Year Development Program, at 6668 (JX 465) ; 1966 Review and Revision of the Uintah & Ouray
Indian Reservation-Wide Program, at 7, 8; and 1969 Annual Report
of the Uintah Indian Tribe, at 1 (JX 473).
-
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Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that
they were entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.M
These signs were clearly intended to designate what the Tribe
thought were the reservation boundaries.

The signs have been

replaced from time to time over the years (with the signs in more
recent times being more elaborate), but they have always indicated that the boundaries of the trust lands were the reservation
boundaries.12/
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dispute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians,
and has lost its Indian character virtually from the opening of
the reservation in 1905.
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances surrounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the conclusion must be that the reservation was disestablished and the
surplus lands which were restored to the public domain are not
part of the reservation—nor do they constitute Indian country as

40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr.
155-57) and Gordon Harmston (Tr. 176-77). A series of photographs of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such
signs appeared on March 22, 1977, were introduced at trial as Ex.
I-4B, coordinated with Ex. I-4A, indicating the precise locations
where the various photographs were taken.

- 47 -

defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151•

Therefore, the state district court

had jurisdiction in this matter.
II.

PERANK'S INDIAN STATUS
18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 preclude state criminal

jurisdiction over "Indians11 who commit crimes within Indian country. Al/

However, these statutes do not provide a specific defi-

nition of who is an Indian.

Perank asserts that he is an Indian,

and contends that Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution^?/
recognizes membership in the Tribe as including all children born
to any resident member of the Tribe.il/
Perank submitted two affidavits below from his father and
mother (R. 69-72), which alleged that Perank's father is a fullblooded Indian enrolled as a member of the Ute Tribe, that his
mother has some Indian blood, and that Perank was born in
Roosevelt while the family was residing on the reservation.

The

record also contains a copy of Perank*s birth certificate (R.
76), and those of other Perank family members (R. 73-75).
As the moving party challenging the court1s jurisdiction,
Perank carries the initial burden of producing sufficient
evidence, beyond mere suppositions or allegations, to establish a

41. As already shown above, the crime here was not committed
in Indian country so Perank1s Indian status is irrelevant.
42. It appears this Court can take judicial notice of the
Tribal Constitution. See Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence.
43. The Ute tribal courts have also adopted this interpretation of the tribal constitution. See Chapoose v. Ute Tribal
Business Committee, Ute Tribal Appellate Court, Civil No. 133-77
(1981).
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jurisdictional question.

Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402

P.2d 541, 546 (1965), and United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041
(9th Cir. 1983).

Moreover, since the basis of his jurisdictional

challenge is that he is an Indian, he carries the initial burden
of producing prima facie evidence to establish such. United
States v. Hester, supra.

Given the evidence Perank presented,

albeit limited, we cannot say that he failed to meet his threshold burden of establishing his status as an Indian and creating a
jurisdictional question on that issue.
Once that threshold showing was made, the burden shifted, and
the State was required to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion
on jurisdiction.

State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426, 428 (Idaho 1980);

Frankel v. Wyllie and Thornhill, Inc., 537 F.Supp. 730, 735 (N.D.
Va. 1982).

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-501(3) provides

that "The existence of jurisdiction . . . shall be established by
a preponderance of the evidence."

While the State argued that

Perank was not an Indian because he was not an enrolled member of
the Tribeii/ and had not participated in tribal activities (R.
87-88), unfortunately, no evidence was presented below by the
State regarding Perank1s Indian status.
Given the state of the record, it cannot be said that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153
was not established below.

44. Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution does not on
its face seem to require formal enrollment as a requisite for
Tribal membership. We note that since his probation revocation
Perank has evidently been enrolled as a tribal member.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of March, 1987.
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